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1 Introduction 1 
In a well-known paper, Kaldor (1961, pp. 178–179) introduced six “stylized facts”, of 2 
which the first four are: rising labor productivity and output; rising capital per worker; a 3 
steady rate of profit; and steady capital-output ratios. The last two imply a steady profit 4 
share, and thus a steady wage share. However, shortly after the publication of Kaldor’s 5 
paper, the wage share rose briefly in many high-income countries and then began to fall, 6 
a trend that continues today. By compiling long historical data series, Maddison (1994, p. 7 
10) demonstrated that capital productivity wanders over a wide range, without exhibiting 8 
a long-run trend, suggesting that over many decades technological change appears to 9 
have a weak Harrod-neutral tendency, but with substantial variations. Observations such 10 
as these put Kaldor’s stylized facts into question and renewed interest in a major concern 11 
of the classical economists – the intersection between growth, distribution and 12 
technological change (Acemoglu, 2002; Brugger & Gehrke, 2016; Tavani & Zamparelli, 13 
2017). 14 
The present paper is a contribution to this literature. It presents a theory of cost-share 15 
induced technological change, an idea first proposed by Hicks (1932, p. 124 ff.). We 16 
show that when combined with a price and wage-setting regime that leaves the profit and 17 
wage shares fixed, the theory is consistent with Marx-biased technological change 18 
(although other outcomes are possible). A regime of target-return pricing generates a 19 
stable dynamic with Harrod-neutral technological change as the equilibrium position, 20 
while allowing for substantial variation. 21 
We build on a theory proposed by Duménil and Lévy (1995), who sought, as we do, to 22 
motivate a theory of cost-share induced technological change in order to explain the 23 
observed behavior of labor productivity and capital-output ratios. Their theory is 24 
evolutionary, in the sense of Nelson and Winter (1982), in that innovation is stochastic, 25 
locally bounded, and shaped by past decisions. They also follow Nelson and Winter 26 
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(1982, pp. 168–169) by separating innovation into a series of distinct processes. With 1 
Duménil and Lévy (1995), we view firms as seeking innovations in a bounded region 2 
close to their existing technologies. They only accept innovations that increase their 3 
profit rate under prevailing prices, which induces a bias in the direction of technological 4 
change. Productivity change is random, and constrained by the potential for discovery. 5 
In the theory presented in this paper, innovation is a microeconomic phenomenon, 6 
located within the firm. It translates into macroeconomic impacts as innovations are taken 7 
up by other firms (Nelson & Winter, 1982, p. 202). Diffusion of innovations weakens the 8 
temporary monopoly earned by the innovating firm, and all firms adjust their prices and 9 
the wages they pay in response to the new cost structure, resulting in a new functional 10 
income distribution. The innovating firm thus faces unintended consequences from its 11 
innovation, as proposed by Marx. The functional income distribution which results from 12 
their and other firms’ innovation, followed by diffusion and price and wage adjustment, 13 
induces subsequent rounds of innovation and price setting, thereby setting up a repeating 14 
dynamic. 15 
The price- and wage-setting step avoids the implication of Okishio’s theorem (Okishio, 16 
1961; Bowles, 1981), which states that with fixed wage rates and the establishment of a 17 
new set of Sraffian production prices, the rate of profit must rise. When wages and prices 18 
are allowed to adjust dynamically after innovation and diffusion, the profit rate can rise, 19 
fall, or stay the same, depending on the price- and wage-setting regime. 20 
While we begin with Duménil and Lévy’s (1995) model, we go significantly beyond it. 21 
First, we relax their restrictive assumptions about technological discovery. Second, we 22 
expand their model from two inputs to production – labor and capital – to an arbitrary 23 
number. Third, we follow Kaldor (1961) by tying the rate of technological change to the 24 
pace of capital accumulation. We illustrate the theory by applying it to a classically-25 
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inspired model along lines proposed by Foley and Michl (1999),2 showing that the 1 
direction of technological change depends on firm pricing strategy: a fixed wage share 2 
leads to Marx-biased technological change, whereas target-return pricing leads to 3 
Kaldor’s stylized fact of trendless capital productivity as an equilibrium position. We 4 
generate scenarios with the model that exhibit changes in productivity and cost shares 5 
similar to those experienced by the US in the latter half of the 20th century. 6 
2 Theories of induced technological change 7 
The existing body of theory on induced technological change offers competing 8 
representations of technological potential and processes of wage and price determination. 9 
The classical economists,3 writing at a time when European countries had large pools of 10 
agricultural workers, developed theories with subsistence wages. They saw that labor 11 
productivity could be improved both through embodied technological change, which 12 
arises from the capabilities of new machines, and disembodied technological change, 13 
which arises from learning-by-doing and procedural improvements. Technological 14 
progress was reflected in increasing output for a given level of total labor, which was 15 
taken to include both the contemporary labor directly used in producing goods and the 16 
historical labor embodied in machines. For Ricardo, a rising money wage rate motivated 17 
technological innovation, thereby driving down the cost of subsistence. Marx, observing 18 
a growing array of machine-built goods, saw more clearly than Ricardo the importance of 19 
cumulative technological change and the increasingly intertwined system of industrial 20 
production. Famously, Marx concluded that an endogenous process drives a falling rate 21 
of profit. Competition for profits drives a substitution of labor for machinery, but the gain 22 
is short-lived as the innovation changes the demand for, and cost of, labor. Marx’s 23 
                                                     
2 The author is applying the theory in a more elaborate post-Keynesian Kaleckian-Harrodian model (Kemp-
Benedict, 2017). That model exhibits Kondratieff-type long waves driven in part by cost-induced 
technological change and in part by wage and price dynamics that operate with lags. 
3 This discussion draws mainly on Kurz’s (2010) paper on the views of Smith, Ricardo and Marx on 
technological progress and income distribution. 
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general story of rational action at a microeconomic level being frustrated by 1 
macroeconomic processes (Kurz, 2016, p. 44) finds an echo in the theory presented in 2 
this paper. 3 
The neoclassical theory of technological change was initiated by Hicks (1932), who 4 
assumed, on marginalist grounds, that wages and prices are determined endogenously by 5 
cost-minimizing firms given a production function. Technical progress was captured in 6 
changes to the production function. Hicks’ theory was criticized by both Keynesian and 7 
neoclassical theorists. Kaldor (1961) argued that neoclassical theory could not account 8 
for the stylized facts he had documented, and proposed a “technical progress function” 9 
that relates capital accumulation and output growth in a Keynesian theory in which firms 10 
have a minimum profit margin and money wages are exogenously specified. Salter (1966 11 
[1960], pp. 43-44) argued that Hicks’ entrepreneur, focused on total cost savings, should 12 
be indifferent to whether those savings come from capital or labor costs. Kennedy4 13 
(1964) responded to Salter by arguing that the entrepreneur should seek to minimize unit 14 
costs within an “innovation-possibility frontier”, which he acknowledged is a “disguised” 15 
form of Kaldor’s technical progress function. Given rather broad conditions for the shape 16 
of the frontier, but arguing that it should not depend on the cost shares themselves, 17 
Kennedy showed that his assumption implies technological change biased in the direction 18 
of the factor with the highest cost share. Sameulson (1965), while disagreeing with much 19 
of Kennedy’s argument, nevertheless took it as a starting point for a thorough 20 
development of induced technological change with a neoclassical production function, 21 
something Kennedy had sought to avoid with the introduction of the innovation-22 
possibility frontier (Kennedy, 1966). This burst of activity faded because of internal 23 
                                                     
4 Kennedy credits an unpublished manuscript by Ahmad for inspiration, while Samuelson (1965) credits an 
unpublished manuscript by Weizäcker with proposing ideas similar to Kennedy’s. 
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problems with the model (Acemoglu, 2002, p. 785; Brugger & Gehrke, 2016; Nordhaus, 1 
1973). 2 
Research within the neoclassical tradition resumed with the emergence of endogenous 3 
growth theories (Romer, 1994). This literature follows convention by assuming a 4 
production function, but abandons perfect competition. Instead, firms engage in 5 
monopolistic competition, gaining monopoly rents for their inventions. Endogenous 6 
growth theories thus change the price and wage-setting assumptions of conventional 7 
neoclassical theory. Acemoglu (2002) built on this body of work to develop a theory of 8 
“directed technological change” in which technological developments are guided by the 9 
interaction of a “price effect”, under which relative prices drive substitution, and a 10 
“market size effect”, under which increasing availability of a factor lowers its price and 11 
raises demand for goods produced with that factor. 12 
Nelson and Winter (1982) sharply criticized the neoclassical theory of technological 13 
change, arguing that it is disconnected from discoveries about the microeconomic 14 
processes of innovation. They proposed an evolutionary theory in which firms engage in 15 
a search for new techniques, starting from their existing technology, knowledge and 16 
practices; technological potential is represented by the possible and probable outcomes of 17 
that search. Nelson and Winter offered a rather complex simulation model featuring 18 
multiple interacting processes of innovation and imitation. Duménil and Lévy (1995) 19 
took their ideas and built a formal model of cost-share induced technological change that 20 
can be more easily incorporated into pen-and-paper models of growth and distribution. 21 
The theories of Kennedy (1964) and Duménil and Lévy (1995) have been applied to 22 
classical and post-Keynesian models. Julius (2005) argued that to some extent Duménil 23 
and Lévy’s theory is formally equivalent to that of Kennedy and he applied their common 24 
core to different distributional regimes. Among other exercises, he introduced 25 
endogenous technological change into a Goodwin (1967) model, as did Shah and Desai 26 
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(1981). Both papers found that the Goodwin cycles disappeared when coupled with cost-1 
shared induced technological change. Zamparelli (2015) applied a modified form of 2 
Kennedy’s theory to a classical model, one in which the innovation-possibility frontier 3 
can be altered through R&D expenditure. Julius (2005, p. 110) noted incidentally that 4 
Duménil and Lévy’s theory places few restrictions on the relationship between the cost 5 
share and technological progress; one of the novel contributions of this paper is to 6 
discover such restrictions. 7 
Foley (2003, p. 42 ff.) approached biased technological change from a classical 8 
perspective. He noted that labor is different from other inputs, and developed a theory 9 
based on that proposition. In particular, he made the plausible suggestion that labor-10 
saving innovation is easier to generalize from one process to another, whereas capital-11 
saving innovation is more likely to differ from one process to another. Foley considered, 12 
but dismissed, Duménil and Lévy’s (1995) theory out of concern that their findings are 13 
dictated by the particulars of their model. In this paper we do not address Foley’s own 14 
theory, which offers a plausible alternative, but propose a model along Duménil and 15 
Lévy’s lines that addresses his critique. 16 
Post-Keynesian theorists typically endogenize technological change by assuming the 17 
Kaldor-Verdoorn law, in which labor productivity growth increases with the pace of 18 
capital accumulation. The Kaldor-Verdoorn law has undergone extensive empirical 19 
testing, and appears to be robust (Lavoie, 2014, pp. 428–430). However, it applies solely 20 
to labor productivity, while, following Kaldor, the capital-output ratio is held fixed. We 21 
derive a generalization of the Kaldor-Verdoorn law by drawing a distinction between 22 
embodied and disembodied technological change. 23 
The model presented in this paper is more consistent with evolutionary, classical, or post-24 
Keynesian theory than it is with neoclassical theory. Unlike in neoclassical theory, we do 25 
not assume a smooth production function, and firms need not know the production 26 
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possibilities frontier. Along evolutionary lines, firms make a local search relative to their 1 
current technology, and implement discoveries that increase their return on capital in the 2 
short run. We consider this to be a plausible conception of technological change. The 3 
history of technology is one of incremental improvements on existing technologies, rather 4 
than a series of leaps to close the gaps opened up by new advances (Basalla, 1988). 5 
Consistent with our non-neoclassical orientation, we assume that prices are set by firms 6 
engaged in oligopolistic competition (Coutts & Norman, 2013), while wages are 7 
influenced by social processes. Thus, both wage and price setting involves choice and 8 
conflict, which adds a degree of freedom – and realism – lacking in neoclassical models. 9 
3 The model of Duménil and Lévy 10 
We begin by presenting a version of Duménil and Lévy’s (1995) evolutionary model, 11 
which has one sector and two factors of production – labor and capital. Firms are 12 
continually searching for innovations, which may or may not be biased towards saving on 13 
one input or another. A bias will arise in any case because, as argued by Okishio (1961), 14 
firms only adopt those innovations that increase their return on capital at fixed prices and 15 
wages. 16 
Duménil and Lévy’s theory incorporates a version of Marxian unintended consequences. 17 
Firms take the individually rational decision to adopt technologies that increase their rate 18 
of profit at constant prices and wages. This gives them a temporary monopoly and the 19 
excess profits that come with it. In the model, the advantage is erased by the following 20 
period, thereby abstracting from the details of diffusion, imitation, and adaptation. Under 21 
oligopolistic competition and guided by institutional norms for wage setting, firms then 22 
adjust prices and wages to reflect their new cost structure. Thus, pricing and wage-setting 23 
behaviors translate the microeconomic behavior proposed by Okishio into 24 
macroeconomic outcomes. Duménil and Lévy assumed a fixed mark-up, but as shown by 25 
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Julius (2005), their theory is consistent with a variety of pricing and wage-setting 1 
strategies. 2 
Firms have a capital productivity κ and labor productivity λ. They have considerable 3 
flexibility to set both wages and prices, employing labor at a wage w and setting a price 4 
P. The profit rate r is then 5 
 1 ,
w
r
P
 

 
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 
  (1) 6 
where π is the profit share. If a firm makes a discovery that would, if implemented, 7 
change productivities by amounts Δκ, Δλ, the firm then asks whether implementing it will 8 
raise profitability in the short run while keeping prices fixed. Using a hat to denote a 9 
growth rate, ˆ ,x x x   we have 10 
 ˆˆˆ ,r

 

    (2) 11 
where ω = 1 – π is the wage share. Firms adopt an innovation if it raises the profit rate at 12 
constant costs, giving the viability condition 13 
 ˆˆ 0.     (3) 14 
We illustrate this condition for the average viable technology in . In the figure we 15 
suppose, with Duménil and Lévy (1995), that innovation is entirely neutral. Innovations 16 
move productivities in a random direction, with a probability distribution that is 17 
circularly symmetric and also symmetric around the ˆˆ   line. With these assumptions, 18 
the firm is just as likely to make a labor-saving or a capital-saving innovation. However, 19 
viable technologies must lie on the positive side of the vector perpendicular to a line that 20 
passes through the origin and the point (π, ω); this introduces a bias. 21 
Two such lines are shown, one with π = 0.3 (so ω = 0.7) and one with π = 0.4 (so ω = 22 
0.6). The average viable technology lies along a vector perpendicular to the lines, and in a 23 
positive direction away from them, shown in the figure by the vectors labeled 1 1
ˆˆ( , )   and 24 
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2 2
ˆˆ( , )  . As shown, in both cases capital productivity is falling, because both 
1ˆ  and 2ˆ  1 
are negative. As the profit share rises, the vector rotates clockwise, so when π = 0.4, 2 
capital productivity is falling more slowly, and labor productivity rising more slowly, 3 
than when π = 0.3. 4 
Figure 1: Biased technological change in the model of Duménil and Lévy 
As successful discoveries are implemented through innovation and emulation, firms 5 
subsequently adjust their prices. They engage in explicit or implicit bargaining over 6 
wages and may reduce prices to expand their market or discourage entry by rival firms. 7 
Duménil and Lévy (1995, p. 237) argued that labor productivity growth depends on the 8 
wage share such that the system approaches an equilibrium with constant labor 9 
productivity growth and a fixed wage share. In the example shown in , this drives a 10 
steady improvement in labor productivity and a steadily falling rate of profit. However, 11 
the result depends on the probability distribution of technological innovation. As the 12 
origin of the probability distribution shifts, and as its boundary expands and contracts, it 13 
is reasonable to suppose that labor productivity growth continues to be biased in a 14 
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positive direction, but capital productivity can either rise or fall, as the average rate of 1 
capital productivity growth becomes positive or negative. In this way Duménil and Lévy 2 
(1995) explained why labor productivity could grow, while the capital-labor ratio 3 
wanders across a broad range. 4 
4 A general model of biased technological change 5 
Duménil and Lévy’s model is compelling, but it has some limitations. As noted by Foley 6 
(2003), their model requires a specific form for the probability distribution of 7 
technological discoveries. Furthermore, neither Marx-biased nor Harrod-neutral change is 8 
guaranteed, because capital productivity growth is determined by exogenous changes in 9 
the probability distribution of technological discovery, and can be positive, negative, or 10 
zero. In this section we generalize their model and show how the capital productivity 11 
growth rate can emerge endogenously. 12 
First, we allow for an arbitrary number of inputs to production and replace the symmetric 13 
probability distribution of technological potential shown in  with an arbitrary probability 14 
distribution. Next, we separate embodied and disembodied technological change and 15 
show how the modified theory implies the Kaldor-Verdoorn law. Finally, we show, in 16 
general terms, how cost share induced technological change, when combined with 17 
specific price and wage-setting dynamics, sets up equilibrating forces with an equilibrium 18 
characterized by constant productivity growth rates and cost shares. 19 
4.1 A multi-factor viability condition 20 
We continue to denote capital productivity by κ and the price level by P, but we now 21 
allow for an arbitrary number of inputs, N, indexed by i = 1,…N, with costs per unit input 22 
qi. Those inputs, including labor, are used in production with productivity νi, so the profit 23 
rate is 24 
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Suppose that a firm makes a discovery that would, if implemented, change productivities 1 
at rates ˆ .i  The change in the profit rate at constant prices is then 2 
 
1
1 1
1 1
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The expression in parentheses is the profit share, 4 
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while the cost share for each factor is 6 
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Using this notation, we can write equation (5) as 8 
 
1
1
ˆ ˆˆ .
N
i i
i
r  
 
     (8) 9 
This equation, a generalization of equation (2), is the change in the profit rate that would 10 
obtain if a firm were to introduce the innovation. An innovation is viable if it increases 11 
the profit rate, and should be rejected if it does not. That is, a viable technology should 12 
satisfy ˆ 0,r   or 13 
 
1
ˆ ˆ 0.
N
i i
i
 

    (9) 14 
To simplify the notation, we extend the set of factors to include capital, defining a cost 15 
share and productivity for index i = 0, 16 
 
0 0, .       (10) 17 
We can then write equation (9) compactly as 18 
 ˆ 0. σ ν   (11) 19 
This is the viability condition for new discoveries – when it holds, discoveries tend to be 20 
accepted, and when it fails, discoveries are certainly rejected. 21 
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In reality the decision will be less clear-cut. First, innovation is a messy process; in its 1 
transit from the R&D department’s bench to the plant floor, a new invention or proposed 2 
innovation will undergo numerous changes that ultimately affect productivity. Second, 3 
while firms do track costs, it is not always straightforward to assign those costs to the 4 
specific product line or process where technological innovation takes place, so firms may 5 
not be confident in their ability to estimate the cost implications of a particular 6 
innovation. Third, a firm may decide to take a strategic loss in order to gain experience 7 
with a new technology or method. These reflections suggest that the crisp cutoff in 8 
expression (9) be replaced with a fuzzy boundary. 9 
The probability of acceptance ˆ( ) σ ν  of a candidate innovation is shown schematically 10 
in Figure 2. It drops quickly to zero when the estimated change in profit rate is negative 11 
and rises quickly to one when the estimated change is positive. The slope of the curve 12 
ˆ( ) σ ν  is very high near ˆ 0, σ ν  dropping rapidly towards zero on either side. In the 13 
ideal case, in which the viability condition in equation (11) holds exactly, ˆ( ) σ ν  14 
Figure 2: Probability that a firm will accept a candidate innovation 
14 
 
becomes the Heaviside (or step) function, while ˆ( ) σ ν  becomes the Dirac delta 1 
function. 2 
4.2 Induced bias in a random innovation process 3 
We follow Hicks (1932, p. 125), Nelson and Winter (1982), and Duménil and Lévy 4 
(1995) in supposing that innovation is a random process. Specifically, we label 5 
innovations by their effect on productivities, and assume that any individual innovation is 6 
drawn from a probability distribution ˆ( ).f ν  The average productivity improvement, ˆ , ν  7 
is then given by integrating over all possible values of νˆ  that satisfy the viability 8 
condition (11). We enforce the viability condition in a probabilistic form using the 9 
probability of acceptance function ˆ( ) σ ν  shown in Figure 2, which is equal to one 10 
when its argument becomes slightly positive and zero when its argument becomes 11 
slightly negative, 12 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ).d f   ν ν σ ν ν ν   (12) 13 
The cost share σ only appears within the acceptance probability function in equation (12), 14 
so we can take the derivative of the ith element of ˆ , ν  ˆ ,i   with respect to σj to find 15 
 
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ).i j i
j
d f
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 
 
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ν σ ν ν   (13) 16 
In this expression we have introduced the slope (or derivative) of the acceptance 17 
probability function, ˆ( ). σ ν  As shown in Figure 2, the acceptance probability has zero 18 
slope everywhere except very close to zero, where its slope becomes extremely large. 19 
Equation (13) is an essential result. It holds for any innovation probability distribution 20 
ˆ( ),f ν  so it is a more general and flexible expression than that found by Duménil and 21 
Lévy (1995), who assumed a specific form for the probability distribution. By allowing 22 
for an arbitrary innovation probability distribution, we address Foley’s (2003) objection 23 
that Duménil and Lévy’s result might depend crucially on their assumption of a 24 
symmetric distribution. 25 
15 
 
We can express the right-hand side of equation (13) as the entries Mij in a matrix M (the 1 
Jacobian matrix), 2 
 
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ).iij j i
j
M d f

  

 
  
 
ν σ ν ν   (14) 3 
As shown in the mathematical appendix, M is, to a good approximation, an 4 
( 1) ( 1)N N    dimensional positive semi-definite matrix of rank N that satisfies6 5 
 0.   σ M M σ   (15) 6 
The properties of the M matrix characterize acceptable models of cost-share induced 7 
technological change consistent with the assumptions that led to equation (12): aggregate 8 
productivity change is an average over the randomly-distributed efforts of many firms, 9 
with each firm accepting only those innovations that increase its profit rate at prevailing 10 
prices and wages. From these properties, we get the immediate result that the own-11 
response of the productivity growth rate to a change in the cost share is positive, 12 
 
ˆ
0.i ii
i
M


 
 

  (16) 13 
By itself, this is not a statement of cost share induced technological change, which 14 
obtains when the total change in the productivity growth rate depends positively on the 15 
change in the cost share, 16 
 
ˆ
0.i
i
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
 


  (17) 17 
As explained in the mathematical appendix, this inequality can be violated for 18 
complementary inputs – for example, capital and energy.7 However, the resulting 19 
dynamics are unstable, and so unlikely to persist. We expect (17) to hold except for 20 
possible transient conditions for complementary factors. 21 
                                                     
6 This relationship holds if the cost shares are treated as independent of each other. In fact, they must sum 
to one, but if that condition is imposed at this stage, then constraints on the resulting Jacobian are not as 
easy to state. In applying the theory it is best to impose the condition at a later stage in the analysis. 
7 The author treats this case in a separate paper (Kemp-Benedict, 2018). 
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It is convenient, when building explicit models, to assume that the approximate equality 1 
in equation (15) is exactly true. With two factors, capital and wages, and associated profit 2 
and wage shares π and ω, it becomes 3 
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  (18) 4 
Because M is symmetric, M01 = M10, and we find 5 
 01 10 00 11.M M M M
 
 
       (19) 6 
All entries can be expressed in terms of a single entry, for example M00, so conditions on 7 
M restrict the relationship between cost shares and productivity growth rates. This 8 
addresses the critique of Julius (2005) that Duménil and Lévy’s theory placed few 9 
constraints on the functional form of the cost share-productivity relationship. 10 
4.3 Capital accumulation and the Kaldor-Verdoorn law 11 
Up to now, we have treated technological innovation as though it were independent of 12 
capital accumulation. For disembodied innovation this is the case: changing operating 13 
procedures, retrofitting, and learning-by-doing can lead to higher capital and labor 14 
productivity. However, the resource-saving qualities of some innovations are embodied 15 
in new capital. In this section we extend the theory to take capital accumulation into 16 
account. 17 
We start with a generic input X that is associated with a given capital stock, K. For 18 
example, X could be the amount of labor, energy or materials required to operate a given 19 
stock of capital. We use a lower-case x to denote the average amount of X per unit of 20 
capital stock, 21 
 .
X
x
K
   (20) 22 
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New capital has a marginal X-to-capital ratio xm. If capital of all vintages depreciates at a 1 
uniform rate δ (the perpetual inventory model), the time rate of change of X (indicated by 2 
a dot) is given by 3 
 .mX x K x I     (21) 4 
Dividing both sides by X = xK, the growth rate of x is found to be 5 
 ˆˆ ,m K
x
x K g
x
      (22) 6 
where gK = I/K is the gross investment rate. In a perpetual inventory model, the growth 7 
rate of the capital stock is 8 
 ˆ .KK g     (23) 9 
Substituting this expression into equation (22) gives 10 
 ˆ 1 .mK
x
x g
x
 
  
 
  (24) 11 
The quantity in parentheses on the right-hand side of this equation is the relative 12 
difference between the marginal and average values of the X-to-capital ratio, which we 13 
denote by rx. The rate of change of the output-to-X ratio – the X-productivity νx – is then 14 
given by 15 
 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ .x K xx g r        (25) 16 
Using the same expressions, but setting X equal to total output, Y, equation (24) gives an 17 
expression for capital productivity growth, 18 
 ˆ 1 .mK K Yg g r



 
   
 
  (26) 19 
Substituting into equation (25) then gives 20 
  ˆ .x K Y xg r r     (27) 21 
This is the expression for X-productivity growth due to embodied technological change. 22 
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Regardless of the source of productivity change, whether embodied or disembodied, the 1 
choice of technology is governed by the viability condition (9). In the case of embodied 2 
technological change, the equations above allow us to write the viability condition as 3 
  
1
0.
N
Y i Y i
i
r r r 

     (28) 4 
By defining a vector with elements 5 
 
0 , ,Y i Y iz r z r r     (29) 6 
we find an expression equivalent to equation (11), 7 
 0. σ z   (30) 8 
Proceeding by analogy with the derivation for disembodied technical change, we have 9 
 ˆ ( ) ( ),K z xg d f   ν z σ z z z   (31) 10 
where φz and fz are the equivalents, for the z variables, to the functions φ and f. This 11 
expression is of precisely the same form as equation (12), and it has similar properties. 12 
Firms may discover, in any time step, a number of possible innovations. Some will 13 
involve embodied technological change and others disembodied technological change. 14 
The first type are governed by equation (31), which we summarize by gK multiplied by a 15 
function Ψi(σ). The second are characterized by equation (12), which we summarize by a 16 
function Φi(σ). Combining the two sources of change, the average rate of productivity 17 
change is given by 18 
 ˆ ( ) ( ).i K i ig    σ σ   (32) 19 
This is a generalization of the Kaldor-Verdoorn law. In the Kaldor-Verdoorn law, Ψi(σ) 20 
and Φi(σ) are constants, but here they are functions of the cost shares. The matrices of 21 
their partial derivatives, 22 
 , ,i iij ij
j j
M N
 
 
 
 
  (33) 23 
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are positive ( 1) ( 1)N N    dimensional matrices that are approximately semi-definite. 1 
The gross investment rate gK may also depend on cost shares, so, through equation (32), 2 
productivity growth rates can have a complex dependence on the cost share. 3 
Separating embodied and disembodied technological change thus allows for richer 4 
dynamics, and the theory developed in this paper offers a generalized form of the Kaldor-5 
Verdoorn law. However, in order to simplify the examples, we do not explore it further in 6 
this paper. 7 
4.4 An equilibrating dynamic 8 
The theory of cost share induced technological change present above suggests that aside 9 
from a transient condition for some complementary factors, we expect the following to 10 
hold: 11 
 
ˆ
0.i
i


 


  (34) 12 
Thus, a rise (fall) in the cost share of a factor stimulates faster (slower) productivity 13 
growth in that factor. We have provided a justification for the assumption using a general 14 
probabilistic model of innovation, along with constraints on the relationship between cost 15 
shares and productivity growth rates. 16 
After innovation and diffusion, all firms respond to productivity changes by setting prices 17 
(following their pricing policies) and wages (through tacit or explicit negotiation with 18 
their employees). From the expression for the cost shares in equation (7), the subsequent 19 
growth in cost shares is, using the average productivity growth rate, 20 
  ˆˆ ˆˆ .P    σ q ν   (35) 21 
The term in parentheses is a vector of growth rates of real unit costs. These, in turn, can 22 
be expected to respond to changes in productivity. From equation (34), an increase in the 23 
cost share associated with input i leads to a rise in its productivity growth rate. 24 
Subsequently, from equation (35), the cost share is driven downward, so this is an 25 
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equilibrating process. The equilibrium is reached when cost shares and productivity 1 
growth rates are not changing: ˆ 0.   ν σ  2 
An equilibrium, once established, can be disturbed by changes in pricing strategy – e.g., 3 
from a fixed mark-up to target-return pricing – or by changes in technological potential as 4 
captured in the probability distribution ˆ( ).f ν  We explore this possibility in the next 5 
section. 6 
5 Applying the theory to a classically-inspired growth model 7 
In this section we apply the theory elaborated above to a simple classically-inspired 8 
growth model with two inputs to production – labor and capital. In constructing the 9 
model we largely follow Foley and Michl (1999). 10 
Different model closures lead to quite different outcomes. We introduce two closures, 11 
which we express in terms of the gross profit rate r. Because it is a product, ,r  the 12 
growth rate of the gross profit rate is the sum of the growth rates of the profit share and 13 
capital productivity, 14 
 ˆˆ ˆ .r      (36) 15 
We first close the model by fixing the profit and wage shares, which corresponds to Foley 16 
and Michl’s (1999, p. 118) model of Marx-biased technological change and to the 17 
standard post-Keynesian assumption of mark-up pricing. In this case, 18 
 ˆˆFixed profit share: .r    (37) 19 
A fixed profit (or wage) share is a realistic assumption when labor has a strong 20 
bargaining position and is able to defend a constant real wage. When labor is not strong, 21 
firms are freer to set prices so as to target a desired rate of return. While target-return 22 
pricing was not considered by Foley and Michl, it is a recognized pricing procedure (Lee, 23 
1999) used particularly by large firms with sufficiently sophisticated accounting systems 24 
21 
 
(Lavoie, 1995, p. 793, 2016, p. 174). Assuming a steady depreciation rate, target-return 1 
pricing implies a fixed profit rate. In that case, 2 
 ˆˆFixed profit rate: .     (38) 3 
The conditions expressed by equations (37) and (38) distinguish different pricing regimes 4 
that depend on firms’ accounting practices and the ability of workers to influence their 5 
wages. 6 
5.1 Capital and labor productivity 7 
For purposes of presentation it is helpful to have a specific model for capital and labor 8 
productivity. We construct one by setting 
10 01M M a     in equation (19).
9 That 9 
determines the other two coefficients, which allows us to write 10 
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  (40) 12 
These partial derivatives correspond to the following two functions, 13 
 ˆ ,k a



    (41) 14 
 ˆ ln .a



    (42) 15 
The expression for capital productivity growth will prove to be particularly convenient 16 
when considering target-return pricing. 17 
5.2 Marx-biased change with a fixed profit share 18 
If the profit share (and therefore the wage share) is fixed at a value ,  then capital and 19 
labor productivity growth rates are given by 20 
                                                     
9 The condition 0 σ M  implies that ˆ  and ˆ  are (approximately) homogeneous functions of σ  of 
order zero. Their first derivatives with respect to the profit share are then homogeneous of order negative 
one. So, M could scale like π-1, ω-1, (π2 + ω2)-1/2, or any other function of order negative one in the cost 
shares. This particular choice leads to a convenient expression for the capital productivity growth rate. 
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1ˆ ln .a




    (44) 2 
These expressions will not change unless the parameters k, ℓ, or a change. Suppose that, 3 
initially, 4 
 
1
.
k a
a a k




  

  (45) 5 
With this assumption, capital productivity is constant (by design), while labor 6 
productivity is growing at a rate 7 
 ˆ ln .
k
a
a
     (46) 8 
This situation might have characterized high-income countries from the 1960s through 9 
the early 1970s, with a stable wage share and steady profit rates. In the early 1970s that 10 
pattern changed. 11 
Gordon (1999, 2012, 2016) has suggested that the pattern changed because the potential 12 
for innovation was declining at the end of a wage of technological progress that started in 13 
the late 19th century10. In the theory presented in this paper, Gordon’s suggestion 14 
translates into a contraction of the probability distribution ˆ( )f ν  of new discoveries. We 15 
can implement Gordon’s hypothesis by proposing that k changes to a new value .k k   16 
After the change, capital productivity growth becomes 17 
  
1
ˆ 0.k a a k k




        (47) 18 
                                                     
10 We do not advocate either for or against Gordon’s thesis. The validity of the cost-share induced theory of 
technological change does not depend on it. Oil crises, war, social conflict, the decline of industrial 
production, and gradually weakening unions could all have plausibly influenced cost shares, wage 
determination, and pricing strategies. For the purposes of this paper, the virtue of Gordon’s mechanism is 
that it can be implemented in a straightforward manner by changing one or two model parameters. 
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Thus, under mark-up pricing, after the probability distribution of new discoveries 1 
contracts, capital productivity begins to shrink, and continues to shrink indefinitely. 2 
Labor productivity continues to grow at the same pace. 3 
The combination of a constant profit share and falling capital productivity corresponds to 4 
the conditions in high-income countries that prevailed through the 1970s to the early 5 
1980s. From equation (37), with a  fixed profit share, if the capital productivity is falling 6 
then the profit rate is also falling. We therefore find Marx-biased technological change as 7 
a special – but important – case of a fixed profit share. 8 
5.3 Harrod-neutral technological change under target-return pricing 9 
During the 1980s, the position of labor was considerably weakened, effectively vanishing 10 
by the 1990s, a few years into what Goldstein (2012) has called the “shareholder value 11 
era”. Whether labor’s decline was driven by falling profitability or other causes is a moot 12 
point, but the increasing strength of firms and their investors vis-à-vis labor allowed firms 13 
to set prices so as to achieve desired returns. 14 
Under target-return pricing, firms adjust their profit margins to maintain a fixed value for 15 
the gross profit rate, r. From equation (38), this implies that the growth rate of the profit 16 
share is the negative of the growth rate of capital productivity. The time rate of change of 17 
the profit share, indicated by a dot, is then given by 18 
 ˆ.     (48) 19 
Substituting from equation (41), we can write this as 20 
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  (49) 21 
The solution is a trajectory that asymptotically approaches a new equilibrium, 22 
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where π0 is the value for the profit share at time t = 0. Suppose that initially the profit 1 
share is 
0 ,   where   satisfies equation (45). Then the exponential terms in equation 2 
(50) cancel and we find (as we should) that the profit share is constant, 3 
 .
a
a k
  

  (51) 4 
If k then changes to ,k k   as we assumed above, while 
0 ,   then we find 5 
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  (52) 6 
Over time, the profit share approaches its new steady-state value of ( ).a a k   Because 7 
k  is less than k, the new profit share is higher than the original. Thus, under target-return 8 
pricing we expect a constant profit rate but a rising profit share, until it has reached its 9 
new steady-state value. During that time, capital productivity continues to fall. From 10 
equation (42), labor productivity growth slows as the profit share increases at the expense 11 
of the wage share. 12 
The combination of steady profit rate, falling capital productivity, slowing labor 13 
productivity growth, and rising profit share, characterized the 1990s in high-income 14 
countries. The 1980s were a transitional period. 15 
5.4 Growth and distribution 16 
We now consider the two cases described above – fixed profit share and fixed profit 17 
rate – in a simple classically-inspired growth model, by adding capital accumulation. 18 
Following Foley and Michl (1999, p. 98) capitalists’ net income is the net profit rate (the 19 
gross profit rate, r, less the depreciation rate δ) multiplied by the previous-period capital 20 
stock, K-1. That income is then divided between net investment (the difference between 21 
current and previous-period capital stocks) and capitalists’ consumption Cc, 22 
    1 1.cC K K r K       (53) 23 
If the capitalists’ marginal rate of saving out of end-of-period wealth is β, then 24 
25 
 
    11 1 .cC r K        (54) 1 
Substituting into equation (53) gives a growth rate of the capital stock gK that depends on 2 
the rate of profit, 3 
  
1
1 1 1.K
K
g r
K
 

        (55) 4 
Output, Y, is given by the product of capital productivity and the capital stock, 5 
 ,Y K   (56) 6 
while the real wage per worker depends on both the profit share and labor productivity, 7 
  1 .w      (57) 8 
Employment, L, is the ratio of GDP to labor productivity, 9 
 .
Y
L

   (58) 10 
In Figure 3 we show indices for κ, r, π, w, Y, and L, as generated by this model. We 11 
assume firms to set a target profit rate starting in year 20. The profit rate ramps up to its 12 
final value, which is achieved in year 30. 13 
To generate the curves in Figure 3, we set a to 1.75%/year and k to 3.25%/year, 14 
corresponding to a profit share of 35%. Labor productivity growth is determined by 15 
setting ℓ to 0.40%/year. Capital productivity, κ, starts at 0.3/year. In the first decade, 16 
steady capital accumulation and a constant capital productivity lead to steadily rising 17 
GDP. The real wage rises at the same as the growth rate of labor productivity, so the 18 
profit share remains at 35%. Employment expands modestly because GDP is growing 19 
faster than labor productivity. 20 
In year 10, we assume that k falls to 80% of its initial value, causing capital productivity 21 
to begin to fall, while ℓ declines to -0.04%/year, causing labor productivity growth to 22 
slow. As the wage continues to grow at historical rates, the profit share falls, and as the 23 
GDP growth rate falls below the labor productivity growth rate, employment begins to 24 
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fall as well. Falling capital productivity and declining profit share combine to drive the 1 
profit rate down. 2 
In year 20, firms and investors react to falling profitability by targeting returns. The target 3 
level rises between years 20 and 30, eventually returning to its initial level. Capital 4 
productivity continues to fall, stabilizing around year 30, while the profit share rises. 5 
GDP growth outstrips labor productivity and wage growth, leading to rising employment 6 
with stagnant wages. 7 
The event that drives the scenario is a contraction in the technological frontier starting in 8 
year 10. This corresponds to Gordon’s (1999, 2012, 2016) proposed mechanism. The 9 
divergent trajectory after that event in Figure 3 follows from changes in price- and wage-10 
setting behaviors. Initially, firm wage- and price-setting strategies are aligned, in which a 11 
steady increase in the wage rate is consistent with a fixed mark-up. However, the 12 
alignment depends on a steady labor and capital productivity growth rates. Once they 13 
begin to slow in year 10, the contradictions become apparent. Firms shift to target-return 14 
Figure 3: Growth and distribution in a classically-inspired model 
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pricing. The result is rising employment with a sharply rising profit share. This is similar 1 
in broad outline to trends in the US from the 1960s through the 1990s. 2 
6 Discussion 3 
The classical preoccupation with the link between growth and distribution has returned to 4 
the research agenda. Hicks’ (1932) theory of cost share induced technological change has 5 
proven both fruitful and frustrating in this effort. Above, we built on a promising but 6 
incomplete theory of cost share induced technological change proposed by Duménil and 7 
Lévy (1995), who sought to construct an evolutionary theory along the lines laid down by 8 
Nelson and Winter (1982). This paper generalized Duménil and Lévy’s theory in 9 
important ways. We allowed for an arbitrary probability distribution of productivity-10 
enhancing innovations and expanded from two to an arbitrary number of inputs to 11 
production. The generalized theory suggests that aside from an edge case involving 12 
complementary inputs, cost shares are related positively to the associated productivity 13 
growth rate. That is, the theory implies cost share induced technological change. When 14 
embodied and disembodied technological change are disentangled, it implies a 15 
generalized form of the Kaldor-Verdoorn law. 16 
The expressions that relate cost shares to productivity growth rates are not arbitrary. To a 17 
good approximation, the Jacobian matrix M is symmetric and positive semi-definite. It is 18 
also of order negative one in the cost shares. This finding addresses Julius’ (2005) 19 
concern that Duménil and Lévy’s theory did not constrain the relationships. The 20 
constraints are sufficient to ensure cost share induced technological change, with the 21 
possible exception of complementary factors. For example, if energy is cheap then 22 
energy-intensive capital can readily substitute for labor without regard to the energy costs 23 
of operating the capital. However, this exceptional case cannot persist because it 24 
generates an unstable dynamic that pushes the cost share of one of the factors upward 25 
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without limit. At some point the cost will be high enough that we expect it to spur a shift 1 
to a different technological regime; for example, toward more energy-efficient capital. 2 
The constraints on the matrix M can potentially be tested empirically, but tests using 3 
macroeconomic data will be difficult. The reason is that M characterizes the change 4 
within a firm, before the technology spreads, triggering changes in prices and wages. 5 
Macroeconomic data reflect the full process of firm-level innovation followed by 6 
diffusion and wage and price adjustment. Tests of the constraints on M must be carried 7 
out using microeconomic data at the level of the appropriate decision unit. 8 
Alternatively, the underlying assumptions of the model can also be explored using 9 
surveys. If firms evaluate potential innovations in a manner consistent with Okishio’s 10 
(1961) viability criterion, then it increases confidence in Duménil and Lévy’s theory and 11 
models derived from it, including the one in this paper. Surveys might also ask about 12 
R&D processes. We have assumed that the probability of improving productivities with a 13 
particular innovation is independent of the cost share, at least in the short run. But if 14 
R&D research programs adapt rapidly to a changing cost structure, then that assumption 15 
may be violated. We further assumed that innovations made by any firm can be rapidly 16 
taken up by other firms. However, diffusion takes time, while, as argued by Foley (2003), 17 
labor-saving innovations may diffuse more readily than capital-saving innovations. An 18 
extended theory could take such additional biases and time lags into account. 19 
7 Conclusion 20 
Kaldor’s stylized facts faced an almost immediate challenge, as the patterns he observed 21 
were violated soon after his paper was published. This drove considerable work on 22 
technological change, resurrecting the classical research question of the links between 23 
growth and distribution. Building on the work of Duménil and Lévy (1995), in this paper 24 
we developed a quite general model of cost-share induced technological change. The 25 
theory makes specific predictions that can potentially be tested empirically, although the 26 
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tests are likely to be challenging. When combined with a particular price- and wage-1 
setting regime, the model generates different distributional and growth outcomes. We 2 
illustrate this point with a classically-inspired growth model. 3 
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9 Mathematical Appendix 1 
We start with equation (14), which we repeat here for convenience, 2 
 
ˆ
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ).iij j i
j
M d f

  

 
  
 
ν σ ν ν   (A1) 3 
Note that if we exchange the i and j indices under the integral the expression is 4 
unchanged, because 5 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ .i j j i     (A2) 6 
This means that the off-diagonal elements of M are symmetric, Mij = Mji. The diagonal 7 
elements are positive, because after setting i = j, all factors under the integral are positive, 8 
 2ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0.ii iM d f    ν σ ν ν   (A3) 9 
For a similar reason, for an arbitrary vector x, a quadratic form constructed with M is 10 
non-negative, 11 
 
2
0
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 0.
N
T
i i
i
d x f 

 
     
 
x M x ν σ ν ν   (A4) 12 
We can derive a further useful property. Compute 13 
 ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ).id f    M σ ν σ ν σ ν ν   (A5) 14 
Because ˆ( ) σ ν  is sharply peaked near zero (see Figure 2), and is zero everywhere else, 15 
we have 16 
 ˆ ˆ( ) 0,  σ ν σ ν   (A6) 17 
to a very good approximation. We conclude, from equation , that 18 
 0,   M σ σ M   (A7) 19 
again to a very good approximation. The quadratic form in equation  is then seen to be 20 
(approximately) zero only for vectors x that are proportional to σ. 21 
From the approximate relationship in equation (A7) we also find that each productivity 22 
growth rate 
iˆ   is (approximately) homogeneous of order zero in the cost shares, 23 
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If the probability distribution ˆ( )f ν  does not change, the total change in iˆ   is given by 2 
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
    (A9) 3 
Because σ is a vector of shares that must sum to one, the change Δσ has to sum to zero, 4 
so it cannot be proportional to σ. From this fact, and the positive semi-definiteness of M, 5 
we find that 6 
 ˆ 0.T T       σ ν σ M σ   (A10) 7 
When the approximate inequality in (A8) holds exactly, it says that the productivity 8 
growth rate for each input is a homogeneous function of the cost shares of order zero. 9 
That means that the matrix of derivatives, M, must be of order negative one in the cost 10 
shares. 11 
9.1 Complementary factors as a special case 12 
The positivity of the own-response in (16) does not guarantee that the total response of 13 
the productivity growth rate of a particular factor to a rise in the cost share will generally 14 
be positive. A possible exception can arise when two factors are complementary. We say 15 
that two factors i and j are complements if Mij is positive, and substitutes if negative. 16 
The distinction between complements and substitutes is important when determining the 17 
total change in productivity growth rates. Cost shares must sum to one, so any increase in 18 
the cost share of one factor must be compensated by a net decrease in the cost shares of 19 
other factors. The most problematic case arises when price and wage setting dynamics are 20 
such that an increase z in the cost share for factor i is compensated entirely by a fall in the 21 
cost share for a complementary factor j, 22 
 , , 0 for , .i j kz z k i j            (A11) 23 
Then the total change in 
iˆ   is equal to 24 
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  (A12) 1 
If factors i and j are substitutes, this is certainly positive, because in that case Mij is 2 
negative. However, if they are complements then this expression could, in principle, be 3 
negative. To constrain the possibilities, we use a property of positive semi-definite 4 
matrices, that the absolute value of the off-diagonal elements is bounded by the average 5 
of the corresponding diagonal entries,11 6 
  
1
.
2
ij ii jjM M M    (A13) 7 
If i and j are complements, then |Mij| = Mij, and we have 8 
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  (A14) 9 
As we have assumed z to be positive, the total change in 
iˆ   is certainly positive when 10 
factor i’s own-response exceeds that for factor j. However, using the same argument, a 11 
rise in the cost share of the other factor, j, could be negative, which can introduce a 12 
positive feedback. Under the assumed conditions, when the jth factor’s cost share rises 13 
and the ith factor’s cost share falls by the same amount, processes that use more of factor 14 
i become profitable even if they drive unit inputs of the jth factor upward. If they are 15 
adopted, we expect the cost share σj to increase, driving a further decline in νj. 16 
This positive feedback, which drives the cost share of factor j steadily upward and that of 17 
factor i downward, clearly cannot continue indefinitely; at some point, factor j figures so 18 
heavily in costs that firms can no longer accept increases in its use even if accompanied 19 
by declines in the cost of factor i. We therefore argue, on economic grounds, that pairs of 20 
factors should normally satisfy 21 
                                                     
11 This can be shown by defining x± such that xi± = 1, xj± = ±1, xk = 0 for k ≠ i, j, and constructing quadratic 
forms with M. 
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  (A15) 1 
For complementary factors, this inequality may be temporarily violated, accompanied by 2 
an unstable dynamic that halts when cost shares have shifted sufficiently that the 3 
inequality is re-established. 4 
 5 
